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Abstract
Many decisions in private and public organizations are made by groups. The
paper explores strategies that the sponsor of a proposal may employ to convince a
qualified majority of group members to approve the proposal. Adopting a mech-
anism design approach to communication, it emphasizes the need to distill in-
formation selectively to key members of the group and to engineer persuasion
cascades in which members who are brought on board sway the opinion of oth-
ers. The paper shows that higher congruence among group members benefits
the sponsor. The paper also unveils the factors, such as the extent of congru-
ence between the group and the sponsor, the size and governance of the group,
that condition the sponsor’s ability to maneuver and get his project approved.
Keywords Group decision-making, selective communication, persuasion cascade,
internal and external congruence.
1 Introduction
Many decisions in private and public organizations are made by groups. For example, in
western democracies Congressional committees command substantial influence on legisla-
tive outcomes through their superior information and their gatekeeping power. Academic
appointments are made by committees or departments; corporate governance is run by
boards of directors; firms’ strategic choices are often made internally by groups of man-
agers; and decisions within families or groups of friends usually require consensus-building.
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“Group decision-making” is also relevant in situations in which an economic agent’s
project requires adhesion by several parties as in joint ventures, standard setting orga-
nizations, coalition governments, or complementary investments by several other agents.
For example, an entrepreneur may need to convince a financier to fund his project and a
supplier to make a specific investment. Similarly, for its wide-body aircraft A380, Airbus
had to convince its board and relevant governments, and must now convince airlines to
buy the planes and airports to make investments in order to accommodate them. Finally,
a summer school organizer may need to convince both a theorist and an empiricist to
accept teaching the chosen topic.
While the economics literature has studied in detail whether the sponsor of an idea
or a project can persuade a single decision-maker to endorse his proposal, surprisingly
little has been written on group persuasion. Yet group decision-making provides for a
rich layer of additional persuasion strategies, including (a) “selective communication”, in
which the sender distills information selectively by choosing whom to talk to, and (b)
“persuasion cascades”, in which the sender “levers support”, namely approaches group
members sequentially and builds on one’s gained adhesion to the project to convince
another either to take a careful look or to rubberstamp altogether.
Persuasion cascades are relied upon early in life as when a child tries to strategically
convince one of his parents with the hope that this will then trigger acceptation by the
other. Lobbyists in Congress engage in so-called “legislator targeting”; and organizations
such as the Democracy Center provide them with advice on how to proceed.1 Supporters
of an academic appointment trying to convince the department to vote for an offer to
the candidate, or corporate executives hoping to get a merger or an investment project
approved by the board, know that success relies on convincing key players (whose identity
depends on the particular decision), who are then likely to win the adhesion of others.
1The reader interested in a pragmatic approach to these questions in the political context is invited
to refer to the Democracy Center’s website at http://www.democracyctr.org/.
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The paper builds a sender/multi-receiver model of persuasion. The receivers (group
members) adopt the sender’s (sponsor’s) project if all or a qualified majority of them are in
favor at the end of the communication process. Unlike existing models of communication
with multiple receivers, which focus on soft information (“recommendations”), the sender
can transmit hard information (evidence, reports, material proofs) to a receiver, who can
then use it to assess her payoff from the project. While the sender has information that
bears on the receivers’ payoffs, we assume for simplicity that he does not know the latter
(and check the robustness of the analysis to this assumption). Communication is costly
in that receivers who are selected to receive this hard information must incur a private
cost in order to assimilate it. Thus, convincing a group member to “take a serious look
at the evidence” may be part of the challenge faced by the sponsor.
The introduction of hard information in sender/multi-receiver modeling underlies the
possibility of persuasion cascade, in which one member is persuaded to endorse the project
or at least to take a serious look at it when she is aware that some other member with
at least some alignment in objectives has already investigated the matter and came out
supportive of the project. Hard information also provides a foundation for strategies
involving selective communication. We for example give formal content to the notion of
“key member” or “member with string pulling ability” as one of “informational pivot”,
namely a member who has enough credibility within the group to sway the vote of (a
qualified majority of) other members.
Another departure from the communication literature is that we adopt a mechanism
design approach: The sender builds a mechanism (a` la Roger Myerson 1982) involving
a sequential disclosure of hard and soft information between the various parties as well
as receivers’ investigation of hard information. This approach can be motivated in two
ways. First, it yields an upper bound on what the sponsor can achieve. Second, and more
descriptively, it gives content to the pro-active role played by sponsors in group decision-
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making. Indeed, we show how both selective communication and persuasion cascades are
in equilibrium engineered by the sponsor.
The sponsor’s ability to maneuver and get his project approved depends on how con-
gruent members are among themselves (“internal congruence”) and how congruent they
are with the sponsor (“external congruence”). For example, for a symmetric distribution,
external congruence refers to the prior probability that a given member benefits from
the sponsor’s project. Under the unanimity rule, the proper notion of internal congru-
ence refers to the vector of probabilities that a given member benefits from the project
given that other members benefit; put differently, and fixing the level of external congru-
ence, one distribution exhibits more internal congruence than another if its hazard rates
are smaller. We show that under the unanimity rule an increase in internal congruence,
keeping external congruence fixed, makes the sponsor’s better off and reduces communi-
cation between the sponsor and the committee in equilibrium. Surprisingly, an increase
in external congruence may hurt the sponsor when members are asymmetric.
We also relate the sponsor’s ability to get his project approved to the size of the group
and its decision-rule. Interestingly, increasing the number of veto powers may make it
easier for the sponsor to have his project adopted even when all members are a priori
reluctant to adopt it. Finally, we show that it may be optimal for the sponsor to create
some ambiguity for each member as to whether other members are already on board.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the sender/multi-receiver model.
Section 3, in the context of a two-member group, develops a mechanism-design approach
and derives the optimal deterministic mechanism. Section 4 studies its properties and
demonstrates its robustness to the sender’s inability to control communication channels
among members and to his holding private information on the members’ benefits. Section
5 allows stochastic mechanisms and shows that ambiguity may benefit the sender. Section
6 extends the analysis to N members. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the main insights
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and discusses alleys for future research.
Relationship to the literature
Our paper is related to and borrows from a number of literatures. Of obvious relevance
is the large single-sender/single-receiver literature initiated by Vincent Crawford and Joel
Sobel (1982)’s seminal paper on the transmission of soft information, and by the work
of Sanford J. Grossman (1981), Grossman and Oliver Hart (1980), and Paul R. Milgrom
(1981) on the disclosure of hard information. Much of this work has assumed that com-
munication is costless, although possibly limited. By contrast, Mathias Dewatripont and
Jean Tirole (2005) emphasize sender and receiver moral hazard in communication.
Following Milgrom (1981), the literature on persuasion games with hard information
investigates optimal mechanisms for the receiver, focusing on the sender’s discretion in
selectively communicating evidence (e.g. Michael J. Fishman and Kathleen M. Hagerty
1990) and on the receiver’s verification strategies (e.g. Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein
2004). In comparison, the sender’s optimal persuasion strategy in our paper relies on
communication of all evidence to a selectively chosen subset among several receivers. Our
model also relates to the formal mechanism design approach with hard evidence of Jess
Bull and Joel Watson (2006).
Our paper is also related to a large literature on committees, that addresses issues
relative to the composition, the internal decision rule and the size of committees. Most of
this literature assumes that group members have exogenous information and that commu-
nication is soft. Committees are viewed as a collection of informed experts in multi-sender
models where the receiver is the unique decision maker who optimally designs the rules
of communication with the committee.2 The focus is also on the aggregation of dispersed
information through debate within a decision making committee, where efficiency is con-
2See among others Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krebhiel (1989), Keith Krebhiel (1990), David
Austen-Smith (1993a & b), Marco Ottaviani and Peter Normal Sorensen (2001), Vijay Krishna and John
Morgan (2001), Klaas Beniers and Otto Swank (2004).
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sidered from the committee point of view.3 Closer to our contribution, Joe Farrell and
Robert Gibbons (1989)’s model of cheap talk with multiple audiences addresses the prob-
lem of selective communication to several receivers. Besides the sole focus on cheap talk,
which precludes persuasion cascades in our model, a key difference with our framework is
that the members of the audience do not form a single decision-making body and so no
group persuasion strategies emerge in their paper.
A recent strand in the literature extends the analysis of committees by explicitly rec-
ognizing, as our paper does, that members have to acquire information before making a
decision and that information acquisition is costly. Nicola Persico (2004), Hao Li (2001)
and Dino Gerardi and Leeat Yariv (2006) consider homogenous committees with simul-
taneous acquisition of information and focus on the tension between ex post efficient
aggregation of information through the choice of a decision rule and ex ante efficient ac-
quisition of information. They characterize the optimal design, in terms of decision rule
or in terms of size, from the committee’s perspective. Hongbin Cai (2003) introduces
heterogenous preferences in a similar model with a given decision rule and analyzes the
socially optimal size of the committee. Like us, Alex Gershkov and Balazs Szentes (2004)
adopt a mechanism design approach to characterize the optimal game form of information
acquisition by committee members and show that information acquisition is sequential;
they derive the stopping rule that is optimal from the committee’s perspective, while we
focus on the optimal persuasion strategy by an external agent who controls the members’
access to information.
Finally, we rule out the possibility of targeting resources or paying bribes to committee
members unlike in some of the literature on lobbying (e.g., Timothy Groseclose and Jim
Snyder 1996 or Assar Lindbeck and Jorgen Weibull 1987).
3See e.g. David Spector (2000) and Hao Li, Sherwin Rosen and Wing Suen (2001).
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2 Model
We consider a sender (S) / multi-receiver (Ri) communication game. An N -member
committee (R1, R2, ..., RN) must decide on whether to endorse a project submitted by a
sponsor S. Committee members simultaneously vote in favor of or against the project.
The decision rule defines an aggregation procedure: under the unanimity rule, all com-
mittee members must approve the project and so the sponsor needs to build a consensus;4
under the more general K-majority rule, no abstention is allowed and the project is
adopted whenever at least K members vote in favor of it.
The project yields benefits s > 0 to S and ri to committee member Ri. The status quo
yields 0 to all parties. The sponsor’s benefit s is common knowledge5 and his objective is
to maximize the expected probability that the project is approved.
Ri’s benefit ri is a priori unknown to anyone
6 and the question for Ri is whether her
benefit from the project is positive or negative. A simple binary model captures this
dilemma; ri can a priori take two values, ri ∈ {−L,G), with 0 < L,G. The realization of
ri in case the project is implemented is not verifiable.
Committee member Ri can simply accept or reject the project on the basis of her prior
pi ≡ Pr{ri = G}. Alternatively, she can learn the exact value of her individual benefit ri
by spending time and effort investigating a detailed report about the project if provided
by the sponsor: the sponsor is an information gatekeeper.7 Investigation is not verifiable,
and so is subject to moral hazard. The personal cost of investigation is denoted c and
4In the unanimity case (and ruling out weakly dominated strategies), each member can as well assume
that all other members vote in favor of the project.
5More generally, receivers infer that the sponsor benefits from the observation that he proposes the
project.
6We later allow S to have a private signal about the distribution of the members’ benefits. See also
Dewatripont-Tirole (2005) for a comparison, in the single-receiver case, of equilibrium behaviors when
the sender knows and does not know the receiver’s payoff.
7The report does not directly contain information about ri. It provides details and data that enable Ri
to figure out the consequences of the project for her own welfare, provided that she devotes the necessary
time and effort.
7
is identical across committee members. There are several possible interpretations for the
“report”. It can be a written document handed over by the sponsor. Alternatively, it
could be a “tutorial” (face–to-face communication) supplied by the sponsor. Its content
could be “issue-relevant” (examine the characteristics of the project) or “issue-irrelevant”
(provide the member with track-record information about the sponsor concerning his
competency or trustworthiness). Committee member Ri can also try to infer information
from the opinion of another member who has investigated. That is, committee member
Ri may use the correlation structure of benefits {ri}Ni=1 to extract information from Rj’s
having investigated and decided to approve the project.
The dictator case
Let uI(p) ≡ pG−c denote the expected benefit from investigation for a single decision-
maker (a “dictator”), when her prior is Pr{r = G} = p, and let uR(p) ≡ pG − (1 − p)L
denote her expected benefit when granting approval without investigation, i.e. when
rubberstamping S’s proposal.
The dictator prefers rubberstamping to rejecting the project without investigation if:8
uR(p) ≥ 0⇐⇒ p ≥ p0 ≡ L
G+ L
.
Similarly, when asked to investigate, she prefers investigating and approving whenever
r = G to rejecting without investigation if
uI(p) ≥ 0⇐⇒ p ≥ p− ≡ c
G
.
And she prefers rubberstamping to investigating and approving whenever r = G if
uR(p) ≥ uI(p)⇐⇒ p ≥ p+ ≡ 1− c
L
.
These thresholds play a central role in the analysis.
8In the analysis, we neglect boundary cases and always assume that when indifferent, a committee
member decides in the sponsor’s best interest.
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Assumption 1. c < GL
G+L
.
If c were too large, i.e. violated Assumption 1, a committee member would never
investigate as a dictator, and a fortiori as a member of a multi-member committee. The
dictator’s behavior is summarized in Lemma 1 and depicted in Figure 1.
Lemma 1. In the absence of a report, the dictator rubberstamps whenever p ≥ p0. When
provided with a report, she rubberstamps the project whenever p ≥ p+, investigates when-
ever p− ≤ p < p+, and turns down the project whenever p < p−. Under Assumption 1,
p− < p0 < p+.
The following terminology, borrowed and adapted from the one used on the Democracy
Center website,9 may help grasp the meaning of the three thresholds. Based on her prior,
a committee member is said to be a hard-core opponent if p < p−, a mellow opponent if
p− ≤ p < p0, an ally if p0 ≤ p; an ally is a champion for the project if p ≥ p+. The
lemma simply says that only a moderate (p− ≤ p < p+) investigates when she has the
opportunity to do so, while an extremist, i.e. either a hard-core opponent or a champion,
does not bother to gather further information by investigating.
FIGURE 1 HERE
Faced with a dictator, the sponsor has two options: present a detailed report to the
dictator and thereby allow her to investigate, or ask her to rubberstamp the project (these
two strategies are equivalent when p ≥ p+ since the dictator rubberstamps anyway, and
when p < p−, as the dictator always rejects the project).
Proposition 1. (The dictator case) When p ≥ p0, the sponsor asks for rubberstamping
and thereby obtains approval with probability 1; when p− ≤ p < p0, the sponsor lets the
dictator investigate and obtains approval whenever r = G, that is with probability p.
9See http://www.democracyctr.org/resources/lobbying.html for details.
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Figure 1
It is optimal for S to let the dictator investigate only when the latter is a mellow
opponent; in all other instances, the decision is taken without any information exchange.
A moderate ally, in particular, would prefer to investigate if she had the chance to, but
she feels confident enough not to oppose the project in the absence of investigation; S
therefore has real authority in this situation.10
3 Optimal deterministic mechanism
For a two-member committee, let P ≡ Pr{r1 = r2 = G} denote the joint probability
that both benefit from the project. The Bayesian update of the prior on ri conditional
on the other member’s benefiting from the project is: pˆi ≡ Pr{ri = G | rj = G} = P/pj.
We assume that committee members’ benefits are affiliated for i = 1, 2, pˆi ≥ pi.11 This
stochastic structure is common knowledge and we label committee members so that R1
is a priori more favorable to the project than R2; that is, p1 ≥ p2.
We characterize the sponsor’s optimal strategy to obtain approval from the committee
under the unanimity rule.12 S chooses which committee members to provide the report to,
in which order, and what information he should disclose in the process. The specification
of the game form to be played by S and committee members is part of S’s optimization
problem. Therefore we follow a mechanism design approach (see Myerson 1982), where
S is the mechanism designer, to obtain an upper bound on S’s payoff without specifying
a game form; we will later show that this upper bound can be simply implemented. The
formal analysis is relegated to Appendix 1 (and to section 5 for general mechanisms);
we provide here only an intuitive presentation of the deterministic mechanism design
10Here, we follow the terminology in Philippe Aghion and Tirole (1997).
11See Proposition 4 for the case of negative correlation in two-member committees.
12The sponsor takes the voting rule as a given. This optimization focuses on his communication
strategy. Note also that we do not consider governance mechanisms in which e.g. voting ties are broken
by a randomizing device (for example the project is adopted with probability 1/2 if it receives only one
vote).
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problem. While focusing on deterministic mechanisms is restrictive, we are able to obtain
a complete characterization of the optimum and to provide intuition for our main results.
A deterministic mechanism maps (r1, r2) (the state of nature) into the set of members
who investigate and the final decision. From the Revelation Principle, we know that we can
restrict attention to obedient and truthful mechanisms: given the information provided
by S, a member must have an incentive to comply with the investigation recommendation
and to report truthfully the value of her benefit to S whenever she investigates. Given the
unanimity decision rule, the optimal obedient and truthful mechanism maximizes Q, the
expected probability that the project is implemented, under these incentive constraints,
under individual rationality constraints and under measurability constraints.
Individual rationality constraints refer to the members’ veto power in the committee:
The project can be approved only if each member expects a non-negative benefit from
the project given (if relevant) her own information from investigation. Measurability
constraints refer to the fact that the outcome cannot depend upon information that is
unknown to all receivers. For instance, a mechanism cannot lead to no one investigating
for some state of nature and Ri investigating in another state of nature, since the recom-
mendation is necessarily made under complete ignorance of the state of nature. Similarly,
the final decision cannot depend on the value of rj if Rj does not investigate.
Working out all the constraints, Appendix 1 shows that one can restrict attention
to only three types of deterministic mechanisms that yield a positive probability of im-
plementing the project, provided they are incentive compatible: (a) the no-investigation
mechanism in which S asks members to vote on the project without letting them inves-
tigate, (b) mechanisms with investigation by Ri, i = 1 or 2, in which S provides only
Ri with a report and asks Rj to rubberstamp, and (c) mechanisms with two sequential
investigations, in which S lets Ri investigate, approve or reject the project, and then lets
11
Rj investigate if ri = G.
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Ignoring incentive compatibility, S has a clear pecking order over these mechanisms.
He prefers the no-investigation mechanism, yielding Q = 1; his next best choice is inves-
tigation by R1 only, yielding Q = p1, and then investigation by R2 only, yielding Q = p2;
finally, his last choice is to have both committee members investigate, with Q = P . We
therefore simply move down S’s pecking order and characterize when a mechanism is
incentive compatible while all preferred ones (absent incentive constraints) are not.
Note first that if both committee members are allies of the sponsor, i.e. if p1 ≥
p2 ≥ p0, members are willing to rubberstamp without investigation and so the project is
implemented with probability Q = 1. This outcome is similar to the one obtained in the
dictator case. The committee is reduced to a mere rubberstamping function even though
moderate allies (p0 ≤ pi < p+) would prefer to have a closer look at the project if given
the chance to. Note also that if both committee members are hard-core opponents, i.e. if
p2 ≤ p1 < p−, the project is never implemented.14 We therefore restrict attention to the
constellation of parameters for which at least one member is not an ally (p2 ≤ p0), and
at least one member is not a hard-core opponent (p1 ≥ p−).
We focus first on the case where R1 is a champion for the project (p1 > p+), while
R2 is an opponent (p2 < p0). There is no way to induce the champion to investigate; she
always prefers rubberstamping to paying the investigation cost. Referring to S’s pecking
order, the only way to get the project approved is to let R2 investigate and decide.
Proposition 2. If R1 is a champion (p1 > p+) and R2 a mellow opponent (p− ≤ p2 < p0),
13Three comments must be made here. (1) This restriction rests on the more general Lemma 3 (see
Appendix 3): one can restrict attention to no-wasteful-investigation mechanisms. (2) To avoid the
standard multiplicity of Nash equilibria in the voting subgame, we assume that committee members
never play weakly dominated strategies in this voting subgame. (3) We do not need to consider truthful
revelation constraints. When Ri has investigated and ri = −L, she vetoes the project and so her utility
is not affected by her report of ri to S. And when ri = G, lying can only hurt Ri in any of mechanisms
described here.
14As we will later see, this no longer holds when stochastic mechanisms are allowed.
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the project is implemented with probability Q = p2. If R1 is a champion and R2 a hard-core
opponent, there is no way to have the project approved (Q = 0)
The proposition formalizes the idea that too strong a support is no useful support.
S’s problem here is to convince the opponent R2. Without any further information, this
opponent will simply reject the proposal. To get R2’s approval, it is therefore necessary
to gather good news about the project. Investigation by R1 could deliver such good news,
but committee member R1 is so enthusiastic about the project that she will never bother
to investigate.15 The sponsor has no choice but to let the opponent investigate. R2 de
facto is a dictator and R1 is of no use for the sponsor’s cause.
Finally assume that p− ≤ p1 ≤ p+ and p2 < p0. In this region, we move down S’s
pecking order, given that having both members rubberstamp is not incentive compatible.
The following proposition, proved in Appendix 1, characterizes the optimal scheme.
Proposition 3. Suppose the committee consists of a moderate and an opponent, i.e.
p− ≤ p1 ≤ p+ and p2 < p0;
• if pˆ2 ≥ p0, the optimal mechanism lets the most favorable member R1 investigate
and decide: the project is implemented with probability Q = p1;
• if pˆ2 < p0 and pˆ1 ≥ p0, the optimal mechanism lets R2 investigate and decide (so,
Q = p2) if p2 ≥ p−; the project cannot be implemented if p2 < p−;
• if pˆi < p0 for i = 1, 2, the optimal mechanism lets both members investigate provided
P ≥ p−, in which case Q = P ; the status quo prevails if P < p−.16
15Why is a champion R1 part of the committee if she always rubberstamps ? Although it may appear
ex post that a champion for the project has a conflict of interest, the distribution of the member’s benefit
or her position on the specific policy might not have been known ex ante, when she was appointed in the
committee, or else her appointment might result from successful lobbying by S.
16The order of investigation does not matter here. Had we introduced a possibly small cost of com-
munication on the sponsor’s side, the optimal mechanism with double investigation would start with an
investigation by R2, so as to save on communication costs (R2 is more likely to reject than R1).
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Proposition 3 shows that for committees that consist of a moderate and an opponent,
communication is required to get the project adopted. More importantly, it demonstrates
the importance of persuasion cascades, in which an opponent Ri (pi < p0) is induced to
rubberstamp if another committee member Rj approves the project after investigation.
In a sense, Ri is willing to delegate authority over the decision to Rj, knowing that Rj
will endorse the project after investigation only if her benefit is positive (rj = G). Rj is
“reliable” for Ri because the information that rj = G is sufficiently good news about ri
that the updated beliefs Pr{ri = G | rj = G} turn Ri into an ally (pˆi ≥ p0).
Of course, the sponsor prefers to rely on a persuasion cascade triggered by the most
favorable committee member, R1, since the probability that this member benefits from
the project is larger than the corresponding probability for the other member. But this
strategy is optimal only if news about r1 > 0 carries enough information to induce R2 to
rubberstamp. If not, the next best strategy is to rely on a persuasion cascade triggered by
the less favorable committee member R2. Even though this implies a smaller probability
of having the project adopted, this strategy dominates having both members investigate,
which leads to approval with probability P .
An illustrative example: the case of nested benefits.
Assume that a project that benefits committee member R2 necessarily also benefits
R1: P = p2. Committee members are then ranked ex post as well as ex ante in terms
of how aligned their objectives are with the sponsor’s. Updated beliefs are: pˆ1 = 1 and
pˆ2 = p2/p1.
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FIGURE 2
Note that R1 always rubberstamps R2’s informed decision and so persuasion cascades
triggered by R2 are possible provided that p2 ≥ p−. Persuasion cascades triggered by R1
if feasible are preferred by S since R1 is a priori more favorable. The optimal mechanism,
depicted in Figure 2, can be straightforwardly computed from previous propositions using
the fact that pˆ2 ≥ p0 ⇔ p2 ≥ p0p1.
Persuasion cascades rely on the fact that it is good news for one committee member
to learn that the other benefits from the project. If committee members’ benefits are
stochastically independent (pˆi = pi for each i), no such cascade can exist. Each committee
member is de facto a dictator and the sponsor has no sophisticated persuasion strategy
relying on group effects.
The cases of nested and independent benefits are two polar cases; indeed, any joint
distribution of benefits can be represented as a mixture of the two:
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• with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1], the two members’ benefits are nested: R1 benefits from
the project whenever R2 does (but the converse does not hold if p1 > p2);
• with probability 1− ρ, the two members’ benefits are drawn independently.17
This representation enables us to define key concepts of congruence. For a stochastic
structure given by (p1, p2, ρ), external congruence refers to the vector (p1, p2) of prior
probabilities that the members’ interests are aligned with the sponsor’s: for a given ρ,
(p′1, p
′
2) exhibits more external congruence than (p1, p2) if p
′
i ≥ pi for all i (with at least one
strict inequality). By contrast, internal congruence among committee members captures
the correlation among the members’ benefits: an increase in internal congruence for a
given (p1, p2) refers to an increase in ρ.
Our results show that the choice of the optimal persuasion strategy does not depend
only on the external congruence of the committee, but also on the degree of internal con-
gruence among committee members. The sponsor finds it optimal to trigger a persuasion
cascade when facing a committee with high internal congruence, while he must convince
both members of a committee with poor internal congruence.
Internal dissonance
When the members’ benefits are negatively correlated, ri = G is bad news for Rj and
therefore pˆi < pi: there is internal dissonance within this committee. Focusing on the
non-trivial case in which pˆ2 < p2 < p0, no persuasion cascade can be initiated with R1
investigating and R2 rubberstamping. So, whenever p2 < p0, R2 must investigate for the
project to have a chance of being approved. Then, R1 knows that the project can be
adopted only if r2 = G. In the optimal mechanism, R1 acts as a dictator conditional
on r2 = G and decides to rubberstamp, investigate or reject the project based on the
17Then P = p2 [ρ+ (1− ρ)p1]. Conversely, for any (p1, p2, P ) with p1 ≥ p2 and p1p2 ≤ P (affiliation),
one can find a unique ρ = P−p1p2p2−p1p2 that yields an equivalent representation of the stochastic structure. In
the symmetric case (p1 = p2), nested benefits correspond to perfectly correlated benefits.
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posterior pˆ1. Since pˆ1 < p1, it is more difficult to get R1’s approval when she is part of a
committee with internal dissonance. Following similar steps as in the proof of Proposition
3, it is easy to characterize the optimal mechanism under internal dissonance:
Proposition 4. (Internal dissonance) Assume the committee is characterized by in-
ternal dissonance, i.e. pˆi ≤ pi for i = 1, 2, and that p2 < p0 and p1 > p−:
• if p2 < p−, the project cannot be implemented;
• if p2 ≥ p− and pˆ1 ≥ p0, the optimal mechanism is to let R2 investigate and R1
rubberstamp: Q = p2;
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• if p2 ≥ p− and pˆ1 < p0, the optimal mechanism is to let both members investigate
whenever P ≥ p−, with Q = P ; if P < p− however, the status quo prevails.
Members’ optimum
For reasons given earlier, we focused on the sponsor’s optimal mechanism. It is
nonetheless interesting to compare the members’ and the sender’s preferences regard-
ing communication. One question is whether members, assuming that they design the
communication process, can force the sender to communicate. Indeed, receivers have ac-
cess to a smaller set of mechanisms than the sponsor if the latter, when prompted to
transfer information to a receiver, can do so perfunctorily (by explaining negligently) or
can overload the receiver with information. When receivers can force the sponsor to com-
municate, then it is easy to see that their optimum never involves less communication
18Note that this does not describe a persuasion cascade: R1 would be willing to rubberstamp based
on her prior and the mechanism exploits the fact that she is still willing to rubberstamp despite the bad
news r2 = G.
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than the sponsor’s optimum,19 and can involve more.20 The next proposition by contrast
assumes that the committee members cannot force the sponsor to communicate, but can
cut communication channels.21
Proposition 5. In the symmetric-receiver case or if G > L, the members never gain
from preventing the sponsor from communicating with one specific receiver (or both).
Intuitively, members want more communication, not less. If they are asymmetric and
the sender communicates with R1, the more favorable receiver, investigation by R2 instead
might maximize the receivers’ average welfare. If G > L, though, the negative externality
from preventing a receiver from benefiting from the project exceeds that imposed on a
receiver who would not like it.
4 Comparative statics and robustness
Stochastic structure
A mere examination of Proposition 3 delivers the following corollary:
Corollary 1. (Benefits from internal congruence) Fixing priors (p1, p2), the prob-
ability of having the project approved is (weakly) increasing in the internal congruence
parameter ρ (or equivalently in pˆ1 and pˆ2).
19There may be a conflict on who should investigate, though. When the sponsor’s optimum is to let
R1 investigate, members may strictly prefer to let R2 investigate (under incentive compatibility) if:
uI(p2) + p2uR(pˆ1)− uI(p1)− p1uR(pˆ2) > 0⇐⇒ L > G and p1 > p2,
that is, if the cost of type I error in adopting the project is larger than the cost of type II error.
20E.g. when p0 < p1 = p2 < p+ and ρ = 1, which corresponds to the dictator case.
21Here a sketch of proof. When the sponsor’s optimum is to let R1 investigate and members consider
cutting communication between S and R1, either investigation by R2 is incentive compatible and foot-
note 19 shows that members lose, or the project is never approved and members lose as well. If the
sponsor’s optimum is to let R2 investigate, R1-investigation violates incentive compatibility and cutting
any communication channels also leads to reject the project. The conclusion is immediate in other cases.
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The sponsor unambiguously benefits from higher internal congruence within the com-
mittee. It should be noted that this holds even when only one member investigates (when
both members investigate, an increase in ρ mechanically raises the probability P that
both favor the project). Proposition 4 further implies that the sponsor benefits from a
decrease in internal dissonance22 under negative correlation.
As for the impact of external congruence, the next corollary shows that an increase in
p1 may hurt S for two reasons: first, if R1 investigates, her endorsement may no longer
be credible enough for R2 (if pˆ2 = p2
[
ρ
p1
+ (1− ρ)
]
falls below p0); second R1 may even
no longer investigate (if p1 becomes greater than p+). In either case, an increase in R1’s
external congruence prevents a persuasion cascade.
Corollary 2. (Potential costs of external congruence) Fixing the degree of internal
congruence ρ, an increase in p1 may lead to a smaller probability of having the project
approved.23
Payoffs
First, although R1’s prior benefit distribution first-order stochastically dominates R2’s,
R1’s expected payoff may be smaller than R2’s, because R1, but not R2, may incur
the investigation cost.24 The sponsor’s reliance on the member with highest external
congruence to win the committee’s adhesion imposes an additional burden on this member
and she may be worse off than her fellow committee member.25
22Under dissonance, ρ can be defined as the probability that r1 and r2 are drawn independently:
P = ρp1p2 + (1 − ρ)max{p1 + p2 − 1; 0}. A decrease in internal dissonance then corresponds to an
increase in ρ.
23By contrast, fixing internal congruence, an increase in p2, the external congruence of the less favorable
member, unambiguously increases Q.
24In particular, when p1 is slightly above p− (while pˆ2 ≥ p0), R1’s expected benefit is almost null.
25This point is to be contrasted with one in Dewatripont-Tirole (2005), according to which a dictator
may be made worse off by an increase in her congruence with the sponsor because she is no longer given
the opportunity to investigate (see also Proposition 1). It also suggests that if the a priori support of
committee members were unknown to the sponsor, the latter could not rely on voluntary revelation of
priors by committee members (the same point also applies to the dictator case).
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Second, suppose that the sponsor can modify project characteristics so as to raise the
members’ benefits or reduce their losses. Such manipulations do not necessarily make it
easier to get the project adopted; as in Corollary 2, too strong an ally is useless, and
raising an ally’s external congruence may decrease the probability of approval.26
Corollary 3. The probability of having the project approved may fall when the potential
loss of the more favorable member is reduced (when her potential loss is L′ < L instead of
L).27
It is moreover immediate to check that reducing the cost of communication for com-
mittee members always raises the probability of implementing the project.28
Third, our analysis extends to continuous payoffs. Intuitively, once a committee mem-
ber knows that she benefits (or loses) from the project, this member wants the probability
that the project is implemented to be maximized (minimized), regardless of the magni-
tude of her payoff. Thus, with deterministic mechanisms and no side communication,
there is no way to elicit anything else but the sign of the payoff.29
Do more veto powers jeopardize project adoption?
Intuition suggests that under the unanimity rule, the larger the committee the stronger
the status-quo bias. Although our model so far deals only with one- and two-member
26Corollary 3 focuses on the interesting case. For completeness, let us summarize the other results: an
increase in any member Ri’s potential gain G′ > G, or a decrease in R2’s potential loss, increase the
probability of having the project approved.
27In that case, the thresholds p0,1 = L
′
G+L′ and p+,1 = 1− cL′ become member-specific and smaller than
their counterparts p0 and p+ for R2. A decrease in R1’s potential loss may then turn R1 into a champion,
which prevents a persuasion cascade initiated by R1.
28Monetary transfers from the sponsor or across committee members could also be part of the mech-
anism design analysis, although they would probably be deemed illegal in many situations, e.g. in
congressional committees. Although we have not done the complete analysis, it appears that the basic
tradeoff between the number of investigations and the sponsor’s objective remains.
29General rubberstamping is optimal when E [ri] ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2; if not, Ri-investigation
with Rj rubberstamping is optimal and yields Q = Pr {ri ≥ 0} provided E [max{ri, 0}] ≥ c and
E [rj | ri ≥ 0] ≥ 0; if no other mechanism is feasible, sequential investigation by Ri and then
Rj yields Q = Pr {min{r1, r2} ≥ 0} provided E [ri | min{r1, r2} ≥ 0] Pr {min{r1, r2} ≥ 0} ≥ c and
E [max{rj , 0} | ri ≥ 0] ≥ c.
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committees, it may shed a new light on this idea and enrich our understanding of bureau-
cracies. The conjecture that larger communities are more likely to vote against change
misses the main point about the use of persuasion cascades to persuade a group. When
internal congruence within the committee is high enough so that pˆ2 ≥ p0, it is possible
to win R2’s adhesion to the project even though she started as an hard-core opponent
(p2 < p−). Adoption would not be possible with a hard-core opponent dictator.
Suppose that committees are formed by randomly selecting members within a given
population of potential members with ex ante unknown support for S’s project. For a
one-member committee (a dictator) the probability of implementing the project is based
merely on external congruence with S; two-member committees may compensate poor ex-
ternal congruence of some of its members by high internal congruence among its members
and therefore lead, ex ante, to a higher probability of implementing S’s project.
Proposition 6. A randomly drawn two-member committee may approve the project more
often than a randomly drawn dictator: a two-member committee is not necessarily more
prone to the status-quo bias than a one-member committee.
Proof. The proof is by way of an example. A randomly-drawn member is a mellow
opponent with probability β (has congruence p = pH , where p− < pH < p0), and a hard-
core opponent with probability 1− β (has congruence pL < p−). Assume that the hard-
core opponent rubberstamps if the mellow opponent investigates and favors the project.
The optimal organization of a two-member committee that turns out to be composed
of at least one mellow opponent is to let a mellow opponent investigate and the other
rubberstamp. The ex ante probability that a randomly drawn two-member committee
approves the project is larger than for a random dictator:
E [Q] = β2pH + 2β(1− β)pH = β(2− β)pH > βpH .
Side communication
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We have assumed that communication can only take place between the sponsor and
committee members. There may be uncontrolled channels of communication among mem-
bers, though. First, members may exchange soft information about their preferences and
about whether they have been asked to investigate. Second, an investigator may, in the
absence of a confidentiality requirement imposed by the sponsor, forward the file to the
other committee member. It is therefore interesting to question the robustness of our
results to the possibility of side communication between committee members. To this
purpose, we exhibit implementation procedures in which the equilibrium that delivers the
optimal outcome is robust to the possibility of side communication, whether the latter
involves cheap talk or file transfer among members.30
Obviously, side communication has no impact when both members rubberstamp, as
they then have no information. Intuitively, it also does not matter under sequential inves-
tigation, because the sponsor both reveals the first investigator’s preferences and hands
over the file to the second investigator. Under a single investigation and rubberstamp-
ing, the member who rubberstamps can as well presume that the investigator liked the
project (otherwise her vote is irrelevant); furthermore, conditional on liking the project,
the investigator is perfectly congruent with the sponsor and has no more interest than the
sponsor in having the second member investigate rather than rubberstamp. Appendix
2 makes this reasoning more rigorous and also looks at side communication following
out-of-equilibrium moves.
Proposition 7. (Robustness to side communication) The sponsor can obtain the
same expected utility even when he does not control communication channels among mem-
bers.
We should however acknowledge that this robustness result is fragile. First, there may
30So, we focus on a weak form of robustness; there exist other equilibria that do not implement the
optimal outcome, if only because of the voting procedure.
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exist other equilibria in which side communication matters. Second, as seen in section 5,
the proposition depends on our focusing on deterministic mechanisms. And third, side
communication could matter if investigation imperfectly revealed to a member her payoff,
since the latter might want double-checking by the other committee member and would
then transmit the file, even when S does not want double investigation.
Informed sponsor
While the sponsor may not know how the description of the project will map into
receivers’ taste for it, one can think of cases where he has a private signal about external
or internal congruence (or both). The following proposition shows that (i) there exists a
pooling equilibrium in which the sponsor behaves as if he had no more information about
the receivers’ payoffs than they do, and (ii) there may exist multiple equilibria, but the
pooling equilibrium is Pareto dominant for all sponsor’s types. Intuitively, the sponsor
wants to minimize the number of investigations, regardless of her information. The equi-
librium in which the sender behaves as if he had no private information is dominant, but
“suspicion equilibria”, in which the committee members become pessimistic if the sponsor
does not let them investigate, may co-exist and involve higher amounts of investigation.
More precisely, and focusing on the symmetric case, let the sponsor’s type t = (p, ρ)
reflect the knowledge he has about the members’ benefits. Assume t is distributed on
[0, 1]2 with full support and let pa ≡ E [p(t)] and pˆa ≡ E [ρ(t) + (1− ρ(t))p(t)] .
Proposition 8. Assume the committee consists of two symmetrical members and focus
on deterministic mechanisms.
i) The equilibrium for the symmetric information situation in which it is common
knowledge that p = pa and pˆ = pˆa is also a pooling equilibrium of the informed-
sponsor game.
ii) This equilibrium is Pareto-dominant for all types of sender.
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Proof. We content ourselves with a sketch of the proof.
i) Suppose that the sponsor offers the best deterministic mechanism for the fictitious
symmetric information case with pa and pˆa, whatever his true type. Suppose that beliefs
are equal to the prior on and off the equilibrium path. By definition of the best mechanism,
a deviation mechanism cannot generate fewer investigations before approval and so all
types weakly prefer the pooling outcome.
ii) In any equilibrium, the number of investigations must be the same; so any equilib-
rium is a full pooling equilibrium. By definition of the optimal mechanism for (pa, pˆa),
the number of investigations cannot be smaller than in the equilibrium of i).31
5 Stochastic mechanisms
The restriction to deterministic mechanisms involves some loss of generality, as we now
show. In this section, we consider a symmetric two-member committee (p1 = p2 = p,
pˆ1 = pˆ2 = pˆ), and we investigate whether S can increase the probability of project
approval by using (symmetric) stochastic mechanisms.
Assume that p− < p < p0 < pˆ, so that the optimal deterministic mechanism consists
in a persuasion cascade where R1, say, investigates and R2 rubberstamps. In this deter-
ministic mechanism, R2 knows that R1 investigates and, given this, she strictly prefers
rubberstamping to rejecting the project: uR(pˆ) > 0 = uR(p0). If R2 knew that R1 does
not investigate, however, she would not rubberstamp since uR(p) < 0. Suppose now that
R1 may or may not investigate; R2 is then willing to rubberstamp provided she is confi-
dent enough that R1 investigates. So, when p < p0 < pˆ, it is not necessary to have R1
investigate with probability 1 to get R2’s approval.
31There may indeed exist Pareto-inferior equilibria. For example, suppose p− < pa < p0 < pˆa. The
pooling in Proposition 8 involves one investigation. Provided that (pa)2 > p−, there exists a pooling, two-
investigation equilibrium in which the receivers believe that p = pa and ρ = 0 in any other mechanism
is offered: S is suspected to know that internal congruence is low when he refuses to let both members
investigate.
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Intuitively, the incentive constraint corresponding to rubberstamping is slack in the
deterministic mechanism. Stochastic mechanisms are lotteries over deterministic mech-
anisms, the realization of which is not observed by committee members. So, they may
be designed to induce appropriate beliefs from the committee members: we say that
stochastic mechanisms exhibit constructive ambiguity. Constructive ambiguity enables S
to reduce the risk that one member gets evidence that she would lose from the project,
and thereby increases the overall probability of having the project adopted.
In Appendix 3, we develop the general mechanism design approach (without the sym-
metry assumption). We prove that we can restrict attention to the simple class of no-
wasteful-investigation mechanisms and we fully characterize the optimal stochastic mech-
anism in the symmetric setting. We here summarize the main implications of this latter
characterization.
Proposition 9. In the symmetric two-member committee, stochastic mechanisms strictly
improve the probability of the project being approved in the following cases:
i) when p− < p < p0 < pˆ, the following mechanism is optimal and yields Q > p:
with probability θ∗ ∈ (0, 1
2
), S asks R1 to investigate and R2 to rubberstamp, with
probability θ∗, S asks R2 to investigate and R1 to rubberstamp, and with probability
γ = 1− 2θ∗, S asks both members to rubberstamp;
ii) when p < p− < p0 < pˆ and p0 >
1+p−
2
, the optimal mechanism yields Q > 0 provided
p is close enough to p−.
Part i) formalizes the intuition provided before. Part ii) shows that, using stochastic
mechanisms, S may obtain approval even when facing two hard-core opponents. The
intuition for this particularly striking result is quite similar to that for the previous result.
Suppose the committee consists of two hard-core opponents (p < p−) with strong internal
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congruence (pˆ > p0). S’s problem is to induce one member to investigate. If a committee
member thought with sufficiently high probability that she is asked to investigate after
her fellow committee member has investigated and discovered that her own benefits are
positive, she would be willing to investigate herself. Hence, there is room again for
constructive ambiguity: S can simply randomize the order in which he asks members
to investigate, without revealing the order that is actually followed.32 This approach is
similar to the practice that consists in getting two major speakers interested in attending a
conference by mentioning the fact that the other speaker will likely attend the conference
herself. If each is sufficiently confident that the other one is seriously considering to
attend, she might indeed be induced to look closely at the program of the conference and
investigate whether she can move her other commitments.
The one-investigation stochastic mechanism described in the first result of Proposition
9 can be easily implemented; the sponsor simply commits to secretly approach one of the
members before the final vote. By contrast, implementing the random sequential investi-
gation mechanism discussed above may be involved if S can approach only one committee
member at a time and communication requires time.33 Note also that Proposition 9 yields
only a weak implementation result: the random order mechanism for example admits an-
other equilibrium where both members simply refuse to investigate and reject the project.
Stochastic mechanisms may therefore come at a cost in terms of realism.
32This mechanism is not optimal; the optimal stochastic mechanism is characterized in Appendix 3.
33 To illustrate the difficulty, suppose that there is a date t = 1 at which the committee must vote
and that with probability 12 the sponsor presents R1 with a detailed report at time t = 1/3 and, if
r1 = G, he transfers the report to R2 at time t = 2/3; with probability 12 the order is reversed. When
being approached at t = 1/3, Ri then knows for sure that she is the first to investigate and constructive
ambiguity collapses. Implementing constructive ambiguity requires a more elaborate type of commitment.
In addition to randomizing the order, the sponsor must also commit to draw a random time t ∈ (0, 1),
according to some probability distribution, at which he will present the first member with a report; if
presenting the report lasts ∆, at t + ∆ he should (conditionally) present the other member with the
report. The distribution of t must be fixed so that when being approached, a committee member draws
an asymptotically zero-power test on the hypothesis that she is the first to be approached, when ∆ goes
to 0.
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Finally, let us discuss the robustness of stochastic mechanisms to side communication.
While the mechanism exhibited in the first result of Proposition 9 is robust to file transfers
(for the now-usual reason that a member who knows she will benefit from the project does
not want to jeopardize the other member’s assent), it is not robust to soft communication
before voting. Indeed it is Pareto optimal and incentive compatible for the members to
communicate to each other when they have been asked to rubberstamp. This prevents
them from foolishly engaging in collective rubberstamping.
By contrast, it can be argued that the random order mechanism is robust to side
communication. It is obviously robust to soft communication before voting as both know
that they benefit from the project when they actually end up adopting it. Similarly, file
transfers are irrelevant. Furthermore the equilibrium outcome is under some conditions
Pareto optimal for the members and remains an equilibrium under soft communication
as to the order of investigation .
6 Internal congruence and selective communication
in N-member committees
Finally, we turn to N -member committees and generalize some of the insights presented in
previous sections. First, in the symmetric case, we propose a more general view on internal
congruence and of how much communication is required in order to obtain approval from
a N -member committee. Second, we discuss selective communication and the role of the
committee’s decision rule in the case of nested preferences.
6.1 Congruence in a symmetric N-member committee
The stochastic structure is symmetric; for any numbering k = 1, 2, ..., N of committee
members, let Pk ≡ Pr{r1 = r2 = ... = rk = G}, P1 = p and P0 = 1. Note that Pk is
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non-increasing in k. It follows that for all k ∈ {1, ..., N − 1},
Pr{rk+1 = G | r1 = r2 = ... = rk = G} = Pk+1
Pk
.
Affiliation implies that Pk+1
Pk
is non-decreasing in k.
Under the unanimity rule, we restrict again the analysis to deterministic mechanisms
that involve k sequential investigations such that Rj investigates for j ≤ k only if all Ri
with i < j have investigated and ri = G.
34 External congruence simply refers to the
marginal probability p that an arbitrary member benefits from the project. We assume
p < p0; otherwise general rubberstamping is obviously the optimal mechanism for the
sponsor. Under this assumption, some communication is required for the project to be
approved and the following proposition characterizes the optimal number of (sequential)
investigations.
Proposition 10. Consider a symmetric N-committee; if there exists k∗, solving
k∗ = min{k ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, Pk+1
Pk
≥ p0 and Pk ≥ p−},
the optimal deterministic mechanism consists in k∗ sequential investigations and Q = Pk∗.
If k∗ does not exist, the project cannot be approved.
Proof. A k-investigation mechanism is implementable if the following holds:
• Any non-investigating member is willing to rubberstamp, i.e. Pk+1
Pk
≥ p0.
• Any investigating member j prefers to investigate after j− 1 other members, which
leads to approval with probability Pr{rj = rj+1 = ... = rk = G | r1 = r2 = ... =
rj−1 = G} = PkPj−1 , rather than to veto the project, i.e. for any j ≤ k,
Pk
Pj−1
G− c ≥ 0.
These inequalities are equivalent to: Pk ≥ p−, since the first investigator (without
any signal about the project) is the most reluctant one.
34Following the same approach as in Appendix 1, it can be proved that there is no loss in generality in
restricting attention to these conditional mechanisms in the class of deterministic mechanisms.
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• Any investigating member j prefers to investigate rather than to rubberstamp, which
would lead to approval with probability Pr{rj+1 = ... = rk = G | r1 = r2 = ... =
rj−1 = G} = Pk−1Pj−1 , i.e. for any j ≤ k,
Pk
Pj−1
G− c ≥ Pk−1
Pj−1
[
Pk
Pk−1
G− (1− Pk
Pk−1
)L
]
⇐⇒ Pk−1
Pj−1
(1− Pk
Pk−1
)L ≥ c.
This set of inequalities is equivalent to: Pk−1 − Pk ≥ 1− p+.
Suppose k∗ exists. Since Pk∗−1 ≥ Pk∗ ≥ p−, it must be that Pk∗Pk∗−1 < p0. But then,
Pk∗−1 − Pk∗ > 1− p0
p0
Pk∗ ≥ 1− p0
p0
p− = 1− p+.
Therefore, the last implementability condition above is slack and a mechanism with k∗
investigations is implementable. Since no mechanism with fewer investigations meets all
incentive compatibility constraints, the conclusion follows.
The project can be approved after investigation by a subset of k members if having
all members in this subset benefit from the project is sufficiently good news for other
members to be willing to rubberstamp. But when k grows, it becomes less likely that
all members in the group benefit and so, that the project be implemented. Investigating
members may then be reluctant to spend the cost of investigation.
Proposition 10 suggests a natural definition of internal congruence in this symmetric
N -member setting.
Definition 1. Fix external congruence p; a committee with stochastic structure P =
{Pk}Nk=1 with P1 = p exhibits higher internal congruence than a committee with stochastic
structure P′ = {P ′k}Nk=1 with P ′1 = p if for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1}, Pk+1Pk ≥
P ′k+1
P ′k
.
Higher internal congruence therefore coincides with uniformly smaller hazard rates,
as:
Pr{rk+1 = −L | r1 = r2 = ... = rk = G} = Pk − Pk+1
Pk
.
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Fixing external congruence (P1 = P
′
1), Definition 1 implies that for all k, Pk ≥ P ′k.
Consequently, the sponsor benefits from an increase in internal congruence, for a given
external congruence (this result generalizes Corollary 1).
Corollary 4. Fix external congruence p and consider two stochastic structures P =
{Pk}Nk=1 and P′ = {P ′k}Nk=1, with P1 = P ′1 = p, such that P exhibits more internal congru-
ence than P′; then, under the optimal deterministic mechanism, Q ≥ Q′.
Remark. While internal congruence is properly apprehended by the (partial) order associ-
ated with hazard rates under the unanimity rule, it could for more general voting rules be
captured by resorting to the theory of copulas, which in particular formalizes the depen-
dence (internal congruence) between random variables with given marginal distributions
(external congruence): see e.g. Roger Nelsen (2006).
6.2 Selective communication in a N-committee with nested pref-
erences
This subsection focuses on nested preferences. Let pi = Pr{ri = G} and suppose com-
mittee members are ranked with respect to their degree of external congruence with the
sponsor, R1 being the most supportive and RN the most radical opponent:
0 ≤ pN ≤ pN−1 ≤ ... ≤ p2 ≤ p1 ≤ 1.
Projects that benefit a given member also benefit all members who are a priori more
supportive of (or less opposed to) the project. That is, for any j, k such that j > k,
rj = G =⇒ rk = G.
The committee makes its decision according to a K-majority rule, with K ≤ N (K =
N corresponds to the unanimity rule). So, S needs to build a consensus among (at least)
K members of the committee to get the project approved. As before, we focus on the
interesting case in which general rubberstamping is not feasible: pK < p0.
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If the voting pivot RK is not a priori willing to rubberstamp (pK < p0), some informa-
tion must be passed on inside the committee to obtain approval. Let us define the infor-
mational pivot Ri∗ as the member who is the most externally congruent member within
the set of committee members Rj who are not champions and whose internal congruence
with RK is sufficiently high to sway the voting pivot’s opinion: Pr{rK = G | rj = G} ≥ p0.
Formally, in the nested structure:
i∗ = min{j | p0pj ≤ pK and pj ≤ p+}.
Clearly, i∗ exists and i∗ ≤ K.
When rubberstamping byK members is not feasible, the sponsor has to let at least one
committee member investigate. The sponsor has an obvious pecking order if he chooses
to let exactly one member investigate: he prefers to approach the most favorable member
among those who have the right incentives to investigate and whose endorsement convinces
a majority of K members to vote in favor of the project. The informational pivot is then
a natural target for selective communication of the report by S. In the unanimity case, it
is indeed possible to prove that the optimal deterministic mechanism is the informational-
pivot mechanism where Ri∗ investigates and all other members rubberstamp. But it is
even possible to characterize the optimal stochastic mechanism.
Moreover, the approach extends to the more general setting with a K-majority rule,
provided that a “coalition walk-away” option is available to committee members at the
voting stage.35 This option is formally defined as follows: if a mechanism yields negative
expected utility ex ante to at least N −K + 1 committee members, these members can
35Alternatively, we can extend the result that the optimal deterministic mechanism is the informational-
pivot mechanism in the case of K-majority under an additional assumption of transparency : under
transparency, all committee members observe which members have investigated and there is a stage of
public communication within the committee before the final vote. Then, it is a dominant strategy for
informed members to publicly and truthfully disclose the value of their benefits at the communication
stage. Transparency is restrictive as it assumes that investigation by a member who is presented with a
report is observable by other members, or else that it is costless.
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coordinate, refuse to communicate with S and (rationally) vote against the project. Intro-
ducing this option imposes that mechanisms be ex ante rational for any voting coalition.36
Proposition 11. (Informational-pivot mechanisms) Suppose that the information
structure is nested, that the committee follows either a K-majority rule with the coalition
walk-away option or the unanimity rule, and that pK < p0;
• if i∗ > 1, p− ≤ pi∗ ≤ pi∗−1 ≤ p+ and pi∗ ≥ p0pi∗−1, the optimal stochastic mechanism
involves a single investigation and Q = pK
p0
, the investigating member is random,
equal to either Ri∗ or Ri∗−1, and her benefit from the project is disclosed but not her
identity;
• if i∗ = 1 and p0 ≤ p1, the optimal stochastic mechanism involves zero or one inves-
tigation by R1 and similarly relies on constructive ambiguity, yielding Q =
pK
p0
.
The proposition identifies the committee member whom the sponsor should try to
convince.37 The informational pivot Ri∗ , or the next more favorable member Ri∗−1, is
asked to investigate and members vote under ambiguity about the investigating member’s
identity. S only reveals that the investigating member benefits from the project, which
generates a strong enough persuasion cascade that member RK , and a fortiori all more
favorable ones, approve the project without further investigation.
In general, the informational pivot differs from the voting pivot RK . That is, the best
strategy of persuasion is usually not to convince the least enthusiastic member. A better
approach is to generate a persuasion cascade that reaches RK . With nested preferences,
this persuasion cascade involves at most a single investigation under unanimity as well
as under a more general K-majority rule. The choice of the informational pivot reflects
36We conjecture that this condition is much stronger than needed.
37The proposition is proved in Appendix 4.
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the trade-off between internal congruence with RK and external congruence with S.
38
Selective communication therefore is a key dimension in the sponsor’s optimal strategy;
irrespective of the rules governing decision-making in the committee, it leads to a strong
distinction between the voting and the informational pivot.39
7 Conclusion
Many decisions in private and public organizations are made by groups. The economic lit-
erature on organizations has devoted surprisingly little attention to how sponsors of ideas
or projects should design their strategies to obtain favorable group decisions. This paper
has attempted to start filling this gap. Taking a mechanism design approach to commu-
nication, it shows that the sponsor should distill information selectively to key members
of the group and engineer persuasion cascades in which members who are brought on
board sway the opinion of others. The paper unveils the factors, such as the extent of
congruence among group members (“internal congruence”) and between them and the
sponsor (“external congruence”), and the size and governance of the group, that con-
dition the sponsor’s ability to maneuver and get his project approved. While external
congruence has received much attention in the literature on a single decision-maker, the
key role of internal congruence and its beneficial effect for the sponsor (for a given external
congruence) is novel.
This work gives content not only to the pro-active role played by sponsors in group
decision-making, but also to the notion of “key member”, whose endorsement is looked
after. A key member turns out to be an “informational pivot”, namely the member who
is most aligned with the sponsor while having enough credibility within the group to
38Note that the existence of a single informational pivot relies on the nestedness of the information
structure (see the previous subsection).
39Interestingly, the Democracy Center’s website makes a similar distinction between “decision-
influencer” and “decision-maker”.
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sway the vote of (a qualified majority of) other members; a key member in general is not
voting-pivotal and may initially oppose the project.
Even in the bare-bones model of this paper, the study of group persuasion unveils a
rich set of insights, confirming some intuitions and invalidating others. On the latter front,
we showed that adding veto powers may actually help the sponsor while an increase in
external congruence may hurt him; that a more congruent group member may be worse off
than an a priori more dissonant member; and that, provided that he can control channels
of communication, the sponsor may gain from creating ambiguity as to whether other
members really are on board. Finally, an increase in internal congruence always benefits
the sponsor.
Needless to say, our work leaves many questions open. Let us just mention three
obvious ones:
Multiple sponsors: Sponsors of alternative projects or mere opponents of the existing
one may also be endowed with information, and themselves engage in targeted lobbying
and the building of persuasion cascades. Developing such a theory of competing advocates
faces the serious challenge of building an equilibrium-mechanism-design methodology for
studying the pro-active role of the sponsors.
Size and composition of groups: We have taken group composition and size as given
(although we performed comparative static exercises on these variables). Although this is
perhaps a fine assumption in groups like families or departments, the size and composition
of committees, boards and most other groups in work environments are primarily driven
by the executive function that they exert. As committees and boards are meant to serve
organizational goals rather than lobbyists’ interests, it would thus make sense to move
one step back and use the results of analyses such as the one proposed here to answer the
more normative question of group size and composition.40
40In the context of a committee model with exogenous signals and no communication among members,
Philip Bond and Hu¨lya Eraslan (2006) makes substantial progress in characterizing the optimal majority
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Two-tier persuasion cascades: even though their informational superiority and gate-
keeping privileges endow them with substantial influence on the final decision, committees
in departments, Congress or boards must still defer to a “higher principal” or “ultimate
decision-maker” (department; full House or, because of pandering concerns, the public at
large; general assembly). Sponsors must then use selective communication and persuasion
building at two levels. For example, lobbying manuals discuss both “inside lobbying” and
“outside lobbying” (meetings with and provision of analysis to legislators, selective media
and grassroot activities).
We leave these and many other fascinating questions related to group persuasion for
future research.
rule for members (taken behind the veil of ignorance).
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Appendix 1: The optimal deterministic mechanism.
We consider a two-member committee with the unanimity rule.
Preliminaries on measurability constraints.
Let ω0 ≡ (−L,−L), ω1 = (G,−L), ω2 = (−L,G), and ω3 = (G,G) be the states of
nature, with probabilities of occurrence pi(ωh), h ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. A payoff-relevant outcome
consists of a list I ∈ 2{1,2} of investigating members and a decision d ∈ {0, 1}. Let
X((I, d) | ω) denote the probability that the outcome is (I, d) when the state of nature is
ω ∈ Ω.
Definition 2. (Measurability) A mechanism is said to be measurable if for any (I, d),
X((I, d) | ω) is measurable with respect to the partition of Ω induced by {ri(.), i ∈ I}; that
is:
X((I, d) | ω) 6= X((I, d) | ω′) =⇒ ∃i ∈ I, such that ri(ω) 6= ri(ω′).
Restricting attention to deterministic mechanisms, the definition implies:
Lemma 2. Consider a deterministic and measurable mechanism (I(.), d(.)); if (I(ω), d(ω)) 6=
(I(ω′), d(ω′)) for ω 6= ω′, there exists i ∈ I(ω) ∩ I(ω′) such that ri(ω) 6= ri(ω′).
Proof. Consider ω and ω′ such that ω 6= ω′ and (I(ω), d(ω)) 6= (I(ω′), d(ω′)). Suppose
that I(ω) ∩ I(ω′) is empty or that any i ∈ I(ω) ∩ I(ω′) satisfies ri(ω) = ri(ω′). Then,
there exists a state of nature ω” such that for any i ∈ I(ω), ri(ω”) = ri(ω) and for any
i ∈ I(ω′), ri(ω”) = ri(ω′). If (I(ω”), d(ω”)) 6= (I(ω), d(ω)), the outcome (I(ω), d(ω)) has
probability 1 in state of nature ω and 0 in state of nature ω”. So, measurability implies
that there exists j ∈ I(ω) such that rj(ω) 6= rj(ω”), which contradicts the definition
of ω”. So, (I(ω”), d(ω”)) = (I(ω), d(ω)). Similarly, (I(ω”), d(ω”)) = (I(ω′), d(ω′)); we
obtain (I(ω), d(ω)) = (I(ω′), d(ω′)), a contradiction.
39
In a two-member committee, this lemma implies first that if I(ω) = ∅ for some state
ω, then I(ω) = ∅ for all states in Ω, which corresponds to the no-investigation mechanism.
Second, if I(ω) = {i} for some ω, then {i} ⊂ I(ω) for all ω in Ω; so, either i is the sole
investigator ever, or there exists some state ω for which both members investigate.
Deterministic mechanisms: no-wasteful-investigation and optimum.
Within the class of measurable deterministic mechanisms, individual rationality im-
plies that if i ∈ I(ω) and ri(ω) = −L, then d(ω) = 0.
If d(ω) = 0 for all ω such that i ∈ I(ω), then Ri’s expected utility conditional on
being asked to investigate is equal to −c and Ri prefers to veto without investigation;
the mechanism would not be obedient. This implies if I(ωi) = I(ω3) = {i}, then d(ωi) =
d(ω3) = 1, and if I(ω3) = {1, 2}, then d(ω3) = 1. In words, it is not incentive compatible
to recommend investigation by Ri if the value of ri does not impact the final decision; we
say that the mechanism implies no-wasteful investigation.
We end up with three types of mechanisms, that lead to Q > 0:
• The no-investigation mechanism where Q = 1; incentive compatibility requires:
uR(pi) ≥ 0⇐⇒ pi ≥ p0.
• Two mechanisms in which only Ri investigates while Rj rubberstamps (for i = 1, 2
and j 6= i); then, Q = pi and incentive compatibility requires:
uI(pi) ≥ max{uR(pi), 0} ⇐⇒ p− ≤ pi ≤ p+
uR(pˆj) ≥ 0⇐⇒ pˆj ≥ p0.
• Mechanisms with two investigations, so that Q = P : two conditional-investigation
mechanisms where Ri investigates first and then Rj if ri = G, for i = 1, 2, for which
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incentive constraints are:
uI(P ) ≥ max{pjuR(pˆi), 0} ⇐⇒ P ≥ p− and pj − P ≥ 1− p+
uI(pˆj) ≥ max{uR(pˆj), 0} ⇐⇒ p− ≤ pˆj ≤ p+,
and one mechanism where both investigate (e.g. simultaneously), for which the
incentive constraints are, for all i and j 6= i:
uI(P ) ≥ max{piuR(pˆj), 0} ⇐⇒ P ≥ p− and pi − P ≥ 1− p+.
Note that P ≥ p− implies that pˆj ≥ p− and
pi − P ≥ 1− p+ ⇐⇒ pˆj ≤ 1− 1− p+
pi
= p+ − (1− p+)(1− pi)
pi
< p+.
Therefore, if the simultaneous investigation mechanism is incentive compatible, so are
both conditional investigation mechanisms; since all yield the same probability of approval
Q, one can restrict attention to the class described in the text. Propositions 2 and 3 follow
straightforwardly from these incentive constraints.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 7.
Assume first, that p2 < p0, p− ≤ p1 ≤ p+ and pˆ2 ≥ p0, so that the optimal mechanism is
to let R1 investigate and R2 rubberstamp.
41 Consider the following game form Γ:
• S presents R1 with a report; R1 investigates (or not) and reports r1 publicly;
• R1 may communicate with R2, that is, she may send R2 a message or transfer her
the file, in which case R2 may investigate;
• R1 and R2 can exchange information;
41The case where R2 investigates and R1 rubberstamps is similar.
41
• finally members vote on the project.
Game form Γ has an equilibrium that implements the optimal mechanism and in which
no side communication takes place on the equilibrium path: R1 investigates in the first
stage, does not transfer the file, and reports truthfully; R2 approves the project, R2 always
believes that R1 has investigated, regardless of whether R1 hands over the file, and R2
never investigates in case R1 transfers the file (R2’s beliefs over the value of r1 in case of
file transfer are irrelevant). R1 is a de facto dictator.
Let us now assume that p− ≤ P < p1 ≤ p+ and for all i = 1, 2, pˆi < p0, in which case
the optimal mechanism is to have both members investigate, with say R2 investigating
conditionally on r1 = G. Consider the following game form Γ
′:
• S presents R1 with a report; R1 investigates (or not), and reports r1 publicly;
• R1 may send R2 a message or transfer her the file;
• S presents R2 with a report if R1 has announced that r1 = G;
• R2 and R1 may exchange information;
• finally members vote on the project.
Game form Γ′ has an equilibrium that implements the optimal mechanism and in
which no side communication takes place on the equilibrium path: R1 investigates and
reports truthfully; if R1 reports she favors the project, R2 investigates; if R1 reports that
r1 = −L, R2 does not investigate even if R1 hands over the file; at the voting stage, both
vote according to their benefit.
Appendix 3: Stochastic mechanisms
General approach and no-wasteful-investigation mechanisms.
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Let ω0 ≡ (−L,−L), ω1 = (G,−L), ω2 = (−L,G) and ω3 = (G,G). Let us introduce
the following notation: for each state ωh, with probability
• γh ≥ 0, no-one investigates and the project is implemented;
• ηh ≥ 0, no-one investigates and the project is NOT implemented;
• θih ≥ 0, only Ri investigates and the project is implemented;
• µih ≥ 0, only Ri investigates and the project is NOT implemented;
• ξh ≥ 0, both investigate and the project is implemented;
• νh ≥ 0, both investigate and the project is NOT implemented.
Measurability. γh and ηh must be constant across ω, equal to γ and η; moreover, θ
i
h
and µih can only depend on ri and we define: θ
i
i = θ
i
3 ≡ θi, µii = µi3 ≡ µi and µij = µi0 = µ¯i.
Interim individual rationality. A member vetoes the project when she knows she loses
from it: θij = θ
i
0 = 0, ξ0 = ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.
Feasibility constraints. For all h, probabilities add up to one. Using previous results,
feasibility constraints for h = 0, 1, 2 and 3 can be written as:
γ + η + µ¯1 + µ¯2 + ν0 = 1,
γ + η + θ1 + µ1 + µ¯2 + ν1 = 1,
γ + η + θ2 + µ¯1 + µ2 + ν2 = 1,
γ + η + θ1 + θ2 + µ1 + µ2 + ξ3 + ν3 = 1.
Incentive constraints. When Ri is supposed to investigate, not investigating and play-
ing as if ri = G must be an unprofitable deviation. By pretending that ri = G, Ri
induces a distribution over outcomes corresponding to ωgi(h) in state of nature ωh where
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gi(0) = gi(i) = i and gi(j) = gi(3) = 3, so that the incentive constraints can be written
as: for all i,
3∑
h=0
pi(ωh)
[(
θih + ξh
)
ri(ωh)−
(
θih + µ
i
h + ξh + νh
)
c
] ≥ 3∑
h=0
pi(ωh)
(
θigi(h) + ξgi(h)
)
ri(ωh).
(1)
When Ri is supposed to investigate, not investigating and playing as if ri = −L must
be an unprofitable deviation, too. Pretending that ri = −L amounts to vetoing the
project, so that this incentive constraint can be simply written as: for all i,
3∑
h=0
pi(ωh)
[(
θih + ξh
)
ri(ωh)−
(
θih + µ
i
h + ξh + νh
)
c
] ≥ 0. (2)
Finally, when the project is supposed to be implemented without Ri’s investigation,
Ri must not prefer vetoing the project (which can also be viewed as ex ante individual
rationality): for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i,
3∑
h=0
pi(ωh)
[
γh + θ
j
h
]
ri(ωh) ≥ 0. (3)
Sponsor’s objectives. The sponsor maximizes the probability of approval Q, given by:
Q =
3∑
h=0
pi(ωh)
[
γh + θ
1
h + θ
2
h + ξh
]
,
under all the constraints presented above.
We first state a central lemma that allows us to restrict attention to the class of no-
wasteful-investigation mechanisms. The proof is available in a supplementary document
on the journal webpage.
Lemma 3. (No wasteful investigation) There is no loss of generality in looking for
the optimal mechanism within the class of no-wasteful-investigation mechanisms, that is
the class of mechanisms described by an element of the 5-simplex (γ, θ1, θ2, λ1, λ2), with
λi = µ¯i − θi, such that:
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• with probability γ, both R1 and R2 rubberstamp the project;
• with probability θi, Ri investigates, and Rj rubberstamps;
• with probability λi, Ri investigates; Rj investigates if Ri benefits from the project;
• with probability 1 − γ − Σiθi − Σiλi, there is no investigation and the status quo
prevails.
Optimal stochastic mechanisms in the symmetric setting.
Focusing now on the symmetric setting, the next proposition completely characterizes
the optimal (stochastic) mechanism; only part of it is used in Proposition 9, and the proof
is available in the supplementary document on the journal webpage.
Proposition 12. The following (symmetric) mechanism is optimal:
• If p ≥ p0, members are asked to rubberstamp (γ = 1) and Q = 1;
• If p− ≤ p < p0 < pˆ, each member is asked to investigate with some probability
smaller than 1/2 and to rubberstamp otherwise: λi = 0, θi =
1−γ
2
= θ∗(p, pˆ) ≡
p0−p
2(p0−p)+p(pˆ−p0) , leading to Q = 1− 2θ∗(p, pˆ)(1− p) > p;
• If p < p− < p0 ≤ pˆ, the optimal mechanism has full support with θi = 1−γ2 = θ∗∗ ≡(
2
(2P−(1+p)p−)
p−−p
+ 1
θ∗
)−1
> 0, λi =
(p−−p)
(2P−(1+p)p−)θ
∗∗ > 0, and Q > 0 provided:
pˆ ≥ max
{
(1 + p)p−
2p
,
(1 + p)
2
+
(1− p)(p− − p)
2p(p+ − p−)
}
; (4)
if (4) does not hold, the project cannot be implemented and Q = 0.
• If pˆ < p0, the optimum is λi = 12 provided P ≥ p−, otherwise Q = 0.
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In a left neighborhood of p−, both terms in the maximum in (4) tends to
1+p−
2
< 1;
therefore, the domain for which Q > 0 is not empty. Moreover, 1+p−
2
< p0 is a sufficient
condition that guarantees that for p close enough to p−, there exists pˆ close to and above
p0 that satisfies the condition. It is routine calculation to prove that the random order
mechanism that corresponds to λi =
1
2
and that is discussed in the text is implementable
under this sufficient condition.
Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 11.
In the nested case with N members, there are N + 1 states of nature: ω0 by convention
denotes the state in which no-one benefits from the project and, for h ∈ {1, 2, ...N}, ωh
denotes the state in which all j ≤ h benefit from the project and all j > h suffer from it.
The probability of state ωh for h ∈ {1, 2, ...N} is pi(ωh) = ph − ph+1, with pN+1 = 0, and
the probability of state ω0 is pi(ω0) = 1− p1.
Consider a (stochastic) mechanism and let x(ωh) denote the probability that the
project is approved in state ωh, for h = 0, 1, ...N . Let Ui denote member Ri’s expected
benefit under this mechanism, not taking into account the cost of possible investigation:
Ui ≡
N∑
h=0
pi(ωh)x(ωh)ri(ωh) = G
N∑
h=i
pi(ωh)x(ωh)− L
i−1∑
h=0
pi(ωh)x(ωh).
Suppose that UK < 0. Then, for any i > K, Ui < 0 so that all members in the
coalition {Ri, i = K,K + 1, ..., N} lose from the project ex ante. Under unanimity, RN
then simply vetoes the project. Under K-majority, the coalition blocks the project by
voting against it, under the coalition walk-away option. In both cases, the mechanism
induces rejection of the project. Therefore, any mechanism that yields ex ante strictly
positive probability of approval must necessarily satisfy: UK ≥ 0.
It is therefore possible to find an upper bound on the ex ante probability of approval
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of the project in the optimal mechanism:
Q ≤ Q¯ ≡ maxx(.)
∑N
h=0 pi(ωh)x(ωh)
s.t. UK ≥ 0.
In this program, it is immediate that x(ωh) = 1 for all h = K,K + 1, ...N and that the
constraint UK ≥ 0 is binding. Therefore,
Q¯ ≤
K−1∑
h=0
pi(ωh)x(ωh) + pK =
G
L
pK + pK =
pK
p0
.
Consider the following stochastic mechanism: S lets Ri∗ investigate with probability
z and Ri∗−1 with probability 1− z, with z such that pKp0 = zpi∗ + (1− z)pi∗−1; S discloses
the outcome of investigation but not the identity of the investigating member before the
vote.
Suppose first that i∗ > 1. By definition, pi∗ ≤ pKp0 < pi∗−1 so that z is uniquely defined.
If p− ≤ pi∗ ≤ pi∗−1 < p+, Ri∗ and Ri∗−1 are actually willing to investigate when asked to.
Conditional on the investigator benefiting from the project, Rj’s posterior probability of
benefiting from it is min
{
pj
zpi∗+(1−z)pi∗−1 ; 1
}
= min
{
pj
p0
pK
; 1
}
for j 6= i∗ and j 6= i∗ − 1; it
is pi∗
pi∗−1
≥ p0 for Ri∗ if Ri∗−1 is the investigating member, and it is equal to 1 for Ri∗−1 if
Ri∗ is the investigator. So, each member Rj, j = 1, 2, ...K, is willing to vote in favor of
the project. This mechanism is incentive compatible and it generates a maximal ex ante
probability of approval: Q = zpi∗ + (1− z)pi∗−1 = pKp0 = Q¯; it is therefore optimal.
Suppose then that i∗ = 1. Then pi∗−1 should be replaced by 1 and the mechanism is to
be interpreted as follows: R1 is asked to investigate with probability z and no one is asked
to investigate with probability 1− z, where z is uniquely defined by: pK
p0
= zpi∗ + (1− z),
given that pi∗ = p1 ≤ pKp0 < 1; then, before the vote, S discloses the outcome of R1’s
investigation only if she loses from the project. The analysis is then similar.
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Supplementary material
Proof of Lemma 3
Referring to Appendix 4 and using feasibility constraints, note that a mechanism is alter-
natively given by (γ, θi, µi, µ¯i, ν0, ν3) and:
η = 1− γ − µ¯1 − µ¯2 − ν0 ≥ 0, (5)
ν1 = ν0 − θ1 − µ1 + µ¯1 ≥ 0, (6)
ν2 = ν0 − θ2 − µ2 + µ¯2 ≥ 0, (7)
ξ3 = ν0 − θ1 − θ2 − µ1 − µ2 + µ¯1 + µ¯2 − ν3 ≥ 0. (8)
Using measurability and individual rationality, the expected probability that the
project is implemented is given by:
Q = γ + p1θ1 + p2θ2 + Pξ3.
Plugging in the value of ξ3 from (8), we find:
Q = γ + (p1 − P )θ1 + (p2 − P )θ2 + Pν0 − Pµ1 − Pµ2 + Pµ¯1 + Pµ¯2 − Pν3. (9)
We now write incentive constraints using measurability, individual rationality and
feasibility constraints. (1) can be written as:
θipi(G− c)− (µipi + µ¯i(1− pi))c+ ξ3P (G− c)
−(ν0(1 + P − p1 − p2) + ν1(p1 − P ) + ν2(p2 − P ) + ν3P )c
≥ θipiG− θi(1− pi)L+ ξ3PG− ξ3(pj − P )L. (10)
Given previous results and using the expressions for ξ3 and νi, this constraint can be
written as: for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i,
θi(1− pi)L+ (ν0 − θ1 − θ2 − µ1 − µ2 + µ¯1 + µ¯2 − ν3) (pj − P )L
≥ c[ν0 + µ¯i + pj (µ¯j − θj − µj)]. (11)
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(2) can be written as:
0 ≤ θipi(G− c)− (µipi + µ¯i(1− pi))c+ ξ3P (G− c)
−(ν0(1 + P − p1 − p2) + ν1(p1 − P ) + ν2(p2 − P ) + ν3P )c. (12)
Using the same manipulations as above, the latter inequality becomes: for i = 1, 2 and
j 6= i,
θipiG+ (ν0 − θ1 − θ2 − µ1 − µ2 + µ¯1 + µ¯2 − ν3)PG
≥ c[ν0 + µ¯i + pj (µ¯j − θj − µj)]. (13)
Finally, we write (3) as follows: for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i,
γuR(pi) + θjpju
R(pˆi) ≥ 0. (14)
The program is to maximize (9) under the constraints (5)-(6)-(7)-(8), (11), (13) and
(14).
It is first immediate that ν3 = 0 at the optimum. With Ai, Bi and Ci the multipliers
associated with constraints (11), (13) and (14), and D, E1, E2 and F the multipliers
associated with (5)-(6)-(7)-(8), one can compute the derivatives of the Lagrangian with
respect to (µ1, µ2, µ¯1, µ¯2, ν0) (omitting the constraints that each of these must lie within
[0, 1]):
∂L
∂µi
= −P − Ai(pj − P )L− Aj(pi − P )L+ Ajcpi
−BiPG−BjPG+Bjcpi − (D + Ei)
∂L
∂µ¯i
= P + Ai(pj − P )L+ Aj(pi − P )L− Ajcpi
+BiPG+BjPG−Bjcpi − c(Ai +Bi) + (D + Ei)− F
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∂L
∂ν0
= P + A1(p2 − P )L− cA1 + A2(p1 − P )L− cA2
+B1PG− cB1 +B2PG− cB2 + (D + E1 + E2)− F
Note that if (Aj +Bj) = 0, then
∂L
∂µi
< 0 and so, µi = 0.
From the derivatives of the Lagrangian, one can derive useful relationships:
∂L
∂µi
+
∂L
∂µ¯i
= −F − c(Ai +Bi) ≤ 0, (15)
∂L
∂µ¯i
+ Ej =
∂L
∂ν0
+ c(1− pi)(Aj +Bj). (16)
Claim 1. The optimum cannot be such that ν0 > 0, µ1 > 0 and µ2 > 0.
Proof. If ν0 > 0, µi > 0 for i = 1, 2, it follows that
∂L
∂ν0
≥ 0, ∂L
∂µi
≥ 0. A1, A2, B1 and B2
must be strictly positive so that ∂L
∂µi
+ ∂L
∂µ¯i
< 0. Hence, ∂L
∂µ¯i
< 0 and µ¯i = 0 from (15).
Moreover, (16) implies that Ej > 0, which implies νj = 0 and so, summing (6) and
(7), ξ3 = −ν0 < 0, a contradiction.
Claim 2. The optimum is without loss of generality such that for i = 1, 2, µiµ¯i = 0.
Proof. Fix µ¯i − µi. A simple examination of Q and of all the constraints reveals that
decreasing µ¯i only relaxes (5) and (11)-(13). Therefore, if µ¯i − µi ≥ 0, the optimum can
be chosen so that µi = 0 and if µ¯i− µi ≤ 0, the optimum can be chosen so that µ¯i = 0.
Therefore, we will now focus on optima that satisfy Claim 2.
Claim 3. An optimum satisfying Claim 2 cannot be such that ν0 = 0 and µi > 0 for some
i.
Proof. Suppose that ν0 = 0 and there exists i such that µi > 0. From Claim 2, the
optimum is such that µ¯i = 0. Then, the constraint that νi ≥ 0 is violated.
Claim 4. An optimum satisfying Claim 2 cannot be such that ν0 > 0, µ1 > 0 and µ2 = 0.
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Proof. Suppose ν0 > 0 and µ1 > 0 = µ2 = µ¯1. It must be that
∂L
∂ν0
≥ 0, ∂L
∂µ1
≥ 0, ∂L
∂µ¯1
≤ 0
and A2 + B2 > 0. As in the proof of Claim 1, it follows that E2 > 0, which implies that
ν2 = 0. So, we have:
0 ≤ ξ3 = ν0 − θ1 − θ2 − µ1 − µ2 + µ¯1 + µ¯2
= ν2 − θ1 − µ1 + µ¯1 = −θ1 − µ1 < 0,
a contradiction.
Claim 5. If µ1 = µ2 = 0, the optimum is without loss of generality such that ν0 = 0.
Proof. Suppose µ1 = µ2 = 0 < ν0, then
∂L
∂ν0
≥ 0.
Note first that if there exists i such that ∂L
∂µ¯i
> 0, then µ¯i = 1 and then η < 0, a
contradiction. So, for i = 1, 2, ∂L
∂µ¯i
≤ 0.
Note also that if Ei > 0, then νi = 0 so that νj = ξ3+ν0 > 0 and therefore Ei = 0. With
the previous remark, using (16), this implies that ∂L
∂ν0
= 0 and for some i, Ai = Bi = 0.
Suppose A1 = B1 = 0 < A2 + B2 and E2 > 0 = E1. Consider the simplified program
where the constraints corresponding to A1, B1 and E1 are omitted. In this program, ν0
and µ¯2 enter only through (ν0 + µ¯2) within (0, 1]; and so, there is no loss of generality in
looking for the optimum with ν0 = 0.
The last possibility is such that Ai = Bi = Ei = 0 for i = 1, 2. Then, the simplified
program where all corresponding constraints are omitted only depends upon ν0+ µ¯1+ µ¯2,
and again, one can set ν0 = 0 without loss of generality.
To summarize, the optimal mechanism is without loss of generality such that ν0 =
µ1 = µ2 = 0. It is fully characterized by (γ, θ1, θ2, µ¯1, µ¯2), or, defining λi = µ¯i − θi, as in
Lemma 3. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
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Proof of Proposition 12
In the symmetric setting, feasibility requires: γ+θ1+θ2+λ1+λ2 = 1. Incentive constraints
(11), (13) and (14) now become:
θi(1− p)L+ (λ1 + λ2)(p− P )L ≥ c[θi + λi + λjp], (17)
θipG+ (λ1 + λ2)PG ≥ c[θi + λi + λjp], (18)
γ(pG− (1− p)L) + θip(pˆG− (1− pˆ)L) ≥ 0. (19)
The sponsor maximizes Q = γ + (θ1 + θ2)p+ (λ1 + λ2)P subject to these constraints.
If (γ, θ1, θ2, λ1, λ2) is an optimal mechanism, (γ,
θ1+θ2
2
, θ1+θ2
2
, λ1+λ2
2
, λ1+λ2
2
) is a symmet-
ric mechanism that satisfies the feasibility constraints, the incentive constraints, obtained
by summing over i = 1 and 2 the constraints (17), (18) and (19), and that yields the same
Q. We will therefore focus wlog on symmetric mechanisms.
For a symmetric mechanism (γ, θ, λ), feasibility requires γ+2θ+2λ = 1 and incentive
constraints become:
θ(p+ − p) + λ{p+(1 + p)− (1− p)− 2P} ≥ 0, (20)
θ(p− p−) + λ(2P − (1 + p)p−) ≥ 0, (21)
γ(p− p0) + θp(pˆ− p0) ≥ 0. (22)
The sponsor maximizes Q = γ + 2θp + 2λP subject to these constraints. Since for
p ≥ p0, the unconstrained optimum (γ = 1) is implementable, we focus on the case where
p < p0.
First case: pˆ < p0. (22) implies that γ = θ = 0. The situation is the symmetric stochas-
tic version of the deterministic situation in which both committee members investigate
sequentially. If P ≥ p−, the optimum is λ = 12 and Q = P , while Q = 0 if P < p−.
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Second case: p− ≤ p < p0 < pˆ. Consider the relaxed program where (20) and (21) are
omitted:
max
θ,λ≥0
{−2θ(1− p)− 2λ(1− P )}
s.t. 0 ≤ 1− 2θ − 2λ
1 ≤ 2λ+ θ [2(p0 − p) + p(pˆ− p0)]
p0 − p .
It is immediate that the solution is λ = 0 and θ = 1−γ
2
= θ∗ ≡ p0−p
2(p0−p)+p(pˆ−p0) . Moreover,
since p− p− ≥ 0 and p+− p > 0, this solution satisfies also (20) and (21). Hence, it is the
optimal mechanism in this range of parameters.
Third case: p < p− < p0 ≤ pˆ. As in the previous case, we use variables (θ, λ) ≥ 0 such
that γ = 1− 2θ − 2λ ≥ 0. The constraints can be written as follows:
λ
[(1− p) + 2P − p+(1 + p)]
p+ − p ≡ Xλ ≤ θ, (23)
θ ≤ λ(2P − (1 + p)p−)
p− − p ≡ Y λ, (24)
1 ≤ 2λ+ θ
θ∗
. (25)
Note first that if Y ≤ 0, then θ = λ = 0 necessarily and the set of constraints is empty.
Hence Q = 0. Suppose now that Y > 0. Again, if X > Y , then the set of constraints is
empty and Q = 0. The project can then be implemented with positive probability only
if Y ≥ X and Y > 0. In this last case, consider the relaxed program where the sole
constraints are θ ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, (24) and (25):
max
θ,λ≥0
{−2θ(1− p)− 2λ(1− P )}
s.t. θ ≤ Y λ
1 ≤ 2λ+ θ
θ∗
.
The constraint (25) must necessarily be binding, since otherwise the optimum would be
θ = λ = 0 which would violate (25). The constraint (24) must also be binding, since
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otherwise, the optimum would be λ = 0, θ = θ∗ and this would violate (24). Hence, the
solution is: θ = Y λ = θ∗∗ ≡ ( 2
Y
+ 1
θ∗
)−1
. Moreover, since (24) is binding and Y ≥ X,
(23) is satisfied. For these values,
γ = 1− 2θ∗∗(1 + 1
Y
) =
1
Y
+ 1
θ∗ − 1
2
Y
+ 1
θ∗
;
since θ∗ ≤ 1
2
and Y > 0, γ > 0.
Therefore, in the range p < p− < p0 ≤ pˆ, there exists a stochastic mechanism that
yields a positive probability Q if and only if:
2P − (1 + p)p− > 0 and
2P − (1 + p)p−
p− − p ≥
(1− p) + 2P − p+(1 + p)
p+ − p
that is, if and only if:
2P > (1 + p)p− and
2P ≥ (1 + p)p+ (1− p) p− − p
p+ − p− .
The condition for Q > 0 is therefore:
pˆ ≥ max{(1 + p)p−
2p
,
(1 + p)
2
+
(1− p)(p− − p)
2p(p+ − p−) }.
In a left neighborhood of p−, both terms in the supremum tends to
1+p−
2
< 1; therefore,
the domain for which Q > 0 is not empty.
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